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PREFACE 
 
The objective of the Sustainable Energy Technologies Reference and Information 
System (SETRIS) at Directorate-General Joint Research Centre of the European 
Commission is to collect, harmonise and validate information on sustainable 
energy technologies and to perform related techno-economic assessments to 
establish, in collaboration with all relevant national partners, the scientific and 
technical reference information required for debate on a sustainable energy 
strategy in an enlarged EU and with a view to global sustainable development. 
 
Produced for SETRIS, this study aims to estimate the supply prospects for coal by 
2030 and beyond as a function of likely demand. The goal of the study is not to 
project future coal demand, supply and prices, but rather to highlight some facts 
and trends that may seriously affect coal supply in the future. The analysis is 
based on a critical review of a number of literature sources, complemented by the 
author’s analysis. Marc Steen, Fred Starr and Aliki Georgakaki (JRC-IE) are 
thanked for their contribution with comments, remarks and suggestions. 
 
This report is complemented by an additional report entitled “Coal of the Future”, 
EUR 22644 EN, prepared by Energy Edge Ltd (UK) as external consultants. The 
latter report aims at further clarifying some important techno-economic points 
identified in the present report in relation to coal supply. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
GUIDANCE FOR THE READER 
 
In addition to the Executive Summary, there is a summary box at the beginning 
of each chapter. Bibliographical references for literature or other sources where 
more information can be found on a given subject are given in square brackets []. 
For the sake of simplicity, these references are numerical, although the data and 
information sources themselves are listed in alphabetic order.  
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CIF – cost, insurance and freight 
CO2 – carbon dioxide 
CTL – coal-to-liquid 
EU – European Union, (European) Community/ies1 
EU-15 – the 15 member states of the European Union until 30 April 2004 
EU-25 – EU-15 plus the 10 new Member States of the European Union as from 
01 May 2004 
EU-27 – EU-25 plus Bulgaria and Romania, which joined the EU on 1 January 
2007 
FSU – Former Soviet Union 
GHG – greenhouse gas(es) 
GTL – gas-to-liquid 
R/P ratio – reserves-to-production ratio 
 
                                          
1 Although from a strict legal standpoint, the European Union and European Community/ies are 
different entities, in this report they are assumed to be identical, reflecting the widely established 
understanding in Europe. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
The sharp increase in oil and gas prices in 2005-2006 and the temporary cutback 
in natural gas supplies from Russia at the end of 2005 have boosted concerns 
about the security, diversity, reliability and affordability of energy supplies in the 
EU. After many years in the shadows, coal has recently come back into fashion 
owing to three advantages over oil and gas: lower prices per energy unit, 
different geopolitical distribution of reserves and a higher reserves-to-production 
ratio. The advances in novel and more environmentally friendly technologies for 
coal utilisation — Clean Coal Technologies — have further increased the interest 
in coal. The full implementation of Clean Coal Technologies will represent a new 
era in coal use that might strengthen its market position, especially if coal 
remains cheaper than oil and gas. Nevertheless, such a scenario raises three 
important questions that are sometimes overlooked: 
1. If Clean Coal Technologies achieve large-scale penetration, will the required 
coal supply be secured in the long term? 
2. If the coal supply is secured, where will it come from? 
3. What will the corresponding trends be in coal costs and prices? 
 
In view of these questions, this study aims to estimate the supply prospects for 
coal by 2030 and beyond as a function of likely demand. The goal of the study is 
not to project future coal demand, supply and prices, but rather to highlight some 
facts and trends that may affect coal supply in the future. The analysis 
concentrates on steam coal used to generate electricity, since the power 
generation sector is by far the largest user of coal worldwide. It covers the main 
coal producing, supplying and/or using regions and countries in the world, with a 
particular focus on the potential implications for the EU. 
 
A review of recent market trends suggests the following: 
1. The supply base of coal is being continuously depleted. World proven reserves 
(i.e. the reserves that are economically recoverable at current economic and 
operating conditions) of coal are decreasing fast, unlike world oil and gas 
reserves, which are proportionally enhanced and are maintaining their levels. 
2. The bulk of coal production and exports is getting concentrated within a few 
countries and market players, which creates the risk of market imperfections. 
3. Coal production costs are steadily rising all over the world, due to the need to 
develop new fields, increasingly difficult geological conditions and additional 
infrastructure costs associated with the exploitation of new fields. 
 
More specifically: 
 Hard coal production in the EU generally suffers from largely depleted 
deposits, declining coal quality and excessively high production costs. 
Although indigenous lignite production is still cost-competitive with hard coal 
imports, the reserves of the main EU lignite producers are not plentiful and 
are being continuously depleted. 
 The lion’s share of world proven coal reserves is concentrated in a few 
countries. Six countries (USA, China, India, Russia, South Africa, Australia) 
hold 84% of world hard coal reserves. Four out of these six (USA, Russia, 
China, Australia) also account for 78% of world brown coal reserves. 
 The immense growth in coal consumption since 2000, driven mainly by China, 
has not been matched by a corresponding development of proven coal 
reserves, despite the increase in world coal prices. From 2000 to 2005, the 
world proven reserves-to-production ratio of coal in fact dropped by almost a 
third, from 277 to 155 years. Conversely, over the same period of time, the 
world proven reserves-to-production ratio of oil and gas remained constant 
(≈45 and ≈65 years, respectively), despite the large growth in demand. If the 
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2000-2005 evolution in the proven reserves-to-production ratios for coal, gas 
and oil continues, the coal ratio could relatively quickly decrease to those of 
natural gas and oil, while the world could run out of economically recoverable 
(at current economic and operating conditions) reserves of coal much earlier 
than widely anticipated. Although such an evolution appears unlikely, these 
trends raise concerns given that the record high coal prices in 2004 and 2005 
have not yet stimulated further development of world proven coal reserves. 
The recent trends are worrying also because coal is projected to be the energy 
source with the largest growth in use worldwide at least up to 20152. The fast-
growing economies of China and India pose particular uncertainties on the 
demand side, owing to the size of their consumption and the relatively poor 
quality of their indigenous coal reserves. Amongst other possible 
consequences, these trends suggest a likely significant increase of world coal 
prices in the coming decades. 
 Over the past 10-15 years, investment in the development of existing and 
new coalfields has been hampered by industry fragmentation, low prices and 
poor return on the investment. Catching up with the recent boom in 
consumption will take time. 
 Australia is gradually becoming the ultimate global supplier of coal. Other 
traditional key exporters like South Africa, Indonesia and USA face significant 
challenges in the development of their coal reserves and export capabilities. 
The USA and China — former large net exporters — are gradually turning into 
large net importers with an enormous potential demand, together with India. 
By way of illustration, all of Australian steam coal exports are equal to only 
5% of Chinese steam coal consumption. Exports from other possible large 
producers (Russia, Kazakhstan, Colombia) face substantial logistics problems. 
 
To improve the situation, considerable efforts must be devoted to enhancing the 
world’s coal supply base by converting resources into reserves and reserves into 
proven reserves. The investment climate in the coalmining sector and related 
logistics sectors needs to be improved. This includes a long-term horizon and 
stable regulatory frameworks. In particular, the uncertainties related to post-
2012 greenhouse gas emission policies worldwide need to be lifted. 
 
Technically and technologically, the coal supply base could be enhanced by: 
development and implementation of improved mapping technologies for coal 
resources and reserves; improvement of existing underground coal mining 
technologies; accelerated research and development of novel coal exploitation 
technologies to give access to “non-conventional coal”, such as underground coal 
gasification and utilisation of coalmine methane gas3.  
 
These regulatory and techno-economic measures to enhance the coal supply base 
will most likely result in higher production costs.  
 
Owing to advances in energy conversion technologies, which allow the production 
of a large variety of end products from different feedstocks, the world oil, gas and 
coal markets are becoming increasingly inter-related. The energy market of the 
future will thus tend to become a market for hydrocarbons rather than one 
differentiated by energy sources. This is expected to have important implications 
for coal supply and demand patterns in the future. While in the past coal has 
been traditionally perceived as an abundant, widely available, cheap, affordable 
and reliable energy source, the coal of the future may look quite different. 
                                          
2 US DOE International Energy Outlook 2006, IEA World Energy Outlook 2006. 
3 Technical and technological ways of enhancing the coal supply base are not discussed in this report, 
but they are thoroughly analysed in the complementary report “Coal of the Future” EUR 22644 EN, 
prepared by Energy Edge Ltd (UK) as external consultants. 
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1. INTRODUCTION: WILL COAL BE A FUEL OF THE FUTURE? 
 
The security and diversity of energy supply is causing growing concern in the EU. 
A renaissance in coal use — the major energy source 50 years ago, but currently 
with a modest and continuously declining contribution to the EU’s energy supply 
— could potentially improve the energy balance of the EU. However, the recent 
trends in coal markets make the long-term supply prospects for coal uncertain. 
This study aims to estimate the supply prospects for coal by 2030 and beyond as 
a function of likely demand by answering three basic questions: 1) Is there 
enough coal? 2) If so, where will this coal come from? 3) What will be the trends 
in coal costs and prices? 
 
The sharp increase in oil prices in 2005-2006 and the temporary cutback in 
natural gas supplies from Russia at the end of 2005 have boosted concerns about 
the security, diversity, reliability and affordability of energy supplies in the EU. 
The EU is particularly vulnerable to such market events and trends, as it holds 
extremely modest shares of world oil and gas reserves — less than 1% and less 
than 2%, respectively [12]. Conversely, oil and gas are the largest components in 
the EU’s gross inland energy consumption — Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1 
Gross inland energy consumption in EU-154 over 1970-2004 (Mtoe) 
Source: Adapted from [18] 
 
These concerns are triggered by the fact that the increasing energy needs of the 
EU are being met by imports from a limited number of countries. The situation is 
even more complicated when we consider that the geopolitical distribution of 
natural gas reserves is now beginning to resemble that of oil reserves. As Figure 
2 indicates, most new discoveries of economically exploitable natural gas since 
1990 have been in the Middle East. These trends are exerting a growing pressure 
on the EU. The EU’s policy-makers are thus considering various preventive 
measures — an EU common energy policy5, improved energy efficiency6, larger 
penetration of renewable energy sources, etc. 
                                          
4 Due to the fundamental political and economic transformations in the 12 new Member States of the 
EU in the 1990s, it is not appropriate or sometimes not even feasible to derive similar retrospective 
long-time data series for them. 
5 COM(2006) 105 
6 COM(2006) 545 
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
1600
19
70
19
72
19
74
19
76
19
78
19
80
19
82
19
84
19
86
19
88
19
90
19
92
19
94
19
96
19
98
20
00
20
02
20
04
M
to
e
Coal Oil Gas Nuclear RES
 7
Figure 2 
Breakdown of proven world oil and gas reserves over 1990-20057 (%) 
Source: Adapted from [12] 
 
Greater use of coal is also an option. Coal was the main energy source not only in 
Europe but also worldwide until the 1960s. Owing to advances in oil extraction, 
conversion and application technologies, coal then began to lose market share to 
oil. The entry of natural gas and nuclear power into the energy market at the 
beginning of 1970s put further pressure on coal. All these new energy sources 
were cleaner to use and in some cases even cheaper. Gradually, coal started to 
be perceived as a dirty and old-fashioned fuel for use in poorer countries. As a 
result, despite the rising energy demand, gross coal consumption in the EU-158 
has been declining since 1970 (Figure 1), while the share of coal in gross inland 
energy consumption has more than halved — from more than 30% to 
approximately 15%. In contrast, coal retained a 25% share in gross inland 
energy consumption globally over the period 1970-2000. 
 
The main reason for the renewed interest in coal as an energy source in the EU is 
the wide perception of it as an abundant, widely available, cheap, affordable and 
reliable energy source, owing to the following factors: 
 There is more coal than oil and gas worldwide. With current consumption 
trends, the reserves-to-production (R/P) ratio of world proven reserves of coal 
is higher than that of world proven reserves of oil and gas — 155 years versus 
40 and 65 years respectively (Remark: Various categories of deposits are 
explained in the Annex to this report). World coal reserves are also more 
evenly distributed around the globe compared to oil and gas reserves. The 
geopolitical distribution of world coal reserves differs from that of oil and gas, 
with the Middle East playing no role in coal supply — Figure 3 and Figure 2. 
 Historically, coal prices have been lower and more stable than oil and gas 
prices, owing to the more even spread of coal reserves and hence the smaller 
room for price manipulation — Figure 4. 
 The EU has larger reserves of coal than of oil or gas, even though it does not 
hold a large share of world coal reserves — Figure 3. Consequently, import 
dependence on solid fuels (i.e. mainly coal) is lower than the dependence on 
gas and oil — Figure 5. A more complete and efficient exploitation of 
indigenous coal reserves would reduce the EU’s overall energy import 
                                          
7 The former Soviet Union, in particular Russia, holds the vast majority of oil and gas reserves in 
Europe / Eurasia. 
8 See footnote 4. 
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dependence. This would also bring additional synergy benefits, e.g. increased 
employment. 
 
Figure 3 
Breakdown of proven world coal reserves at the end of 2005 (%) 
Source: Adapted from [12] 
 
Figure 4 
Selected oil, gas and coal prices in Europe over 1985-2005 (recalculated in 
USD/toe) 
Source: Adapted from [12, 18, 57] 
 
 The development of novel, more environmentally friendly coal technologies — 
Clean Coal Technologies. Designed to enhance both the efficiency and the 
environmental acceptability of coal extraction, preparation and use [101], 
these technologies are believed capable of bringing coal back into fashion. 
This is because the environmental concerns with coal are associated with the 
ways in which coal is used rather than with coal itself. Although some Clean 
Coal Technologies are still at the research and development stage, they are 
enjoying growing interest worldwide.  
 
All these facts suggest that coal could have a bright future, undergoing a real 
renaissance and becoming once again a preferred fuel option. Such a perspective  
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Figure 5 
Retrospective (1995-2000) and projected (2005-2030) import dependence of EU-
27 – total and by fuels (%) 
Source: Adapted from [30] 
 
could become reality, but… a few other very important facts that are often 
overlooked should be taken into account as well: 
 Coal has been the energy source with the fastest growing consumption and 
production in the world since 2000 — Figure 6. The largest growth in 
consumption has been in the developing economies9. In addition, coal is 
projected to be the fastest growing energy source worldwide by 2025 [26]. 
 
Figure 6 
Index of world oil, natural gas and coal primary production over 1971-2004 
(index points, 1971=100) 
Source: Adapted from [12, 18] 
 
 The recent immense growth in coal consumption has not been matched by a 
corresponding development of the supply base, unlike with oil and gas. 
Consequently, the coal R/P ratio, which had remained constantly above 200 
                                          
9 China alone accounts for about 80% of the recent growth in hard coal worldwide [57]. 
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years for several decades, plunged from 227 years in 2000 to only 155 years 
in 2005. Conversely, over the same period of time, the world proven R/P ratio 
of oil and gas remained basically constant despite the large growth in demand 
— Figure 7. If the 2000-2005 evolution in the proven reserves-to-production 
ratios for coal, gas and oil continues, the coal ratio could relatively quickly 
decrease to those of natural gas and oil, while the world could run out of 
economically recoverable (at current economic and operating conditions) 
reserves of coal much earlier than widely anticipated. Although such an 
evolution appears unlikely, these trends raise concerns given that the record 
high coal prices in 2004 and 2005 (Figure 4) have not yet stimulated further 
development of world proven coal reserves. 
 
Figure 7 
Oil, gas and coal reserves-to-production (R/P) ratios in the world over 2000-2005 
(years) 
Source: Adapted from [7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12] 
 
In the light of the above reflections, this study aims to estimate the supply 
prospects for coal by 2030 and beyond as a function of likely demand. The goal of 
the study is not to project future coal demand, supply and prices, but rather to 
highlight some facts and trends that may affect coal supply in the future. The 
study thus endeavours to answer the following three questions: 
1. If Clean Coal Technologies achieve large-scale penetration, will the required 
coal supply be secured in the long term? 
2. If the coal supply is secured, where will it come from? 
3. What will be the corresponding trends in coal costs and prices? 
 
The analysis covers the main coal producing, supplying and/or using regions and 
countries in the world, with a particular focus on the potential implications for the 
EU. Where possible, the analysis has been performed for the EU-27, i.e. 
incorporating the brand-new EU members Bulgaria and Romania. Other upfront 
assumptions and limitations in the analysis are explained in the following chapter. 
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2. COAL: BASIC FACTS, INFORMATION AND ASSUMPTIONS 
 
In terms of composition, there are several grades of coal suitable for different 
applications. This analysis covers mainly the power generation sector, as it is by 
far the largest coal user. Special emphasis is given to patterns in the electricity 
market and the related natural gas market, since natural gas is the main 
competitor of coal in power generation. The high-quality hard coal for steam 
generation (steam coal), also traded internationally, is the main coal grade 
analysed. 
Although relatively more diversified than e.g. natural gas reserves, world coal 
reserves tend to be concentrated in a small number of non-EU countries. Proven 
coal reserves, i.e. the technically or economically exploitable share of coal 
deposits, are not static, but grow when coal prices increase and/or following 
advances in mining technologies and/or discoveries of new deposits. Conversely, 
they can decrease if coal prices fall. 
 
Coal is the fossil fuel with the highest carbon intensity10, having carbon content of 
50-98%. Other coal components are hydrogen (3-13%), oxygen, and small 
amounts of nitrogen, sulphur and other elements. Coal also contains different 
proportions of water and inorganic matter that remain as residue (ash) upon 
burning [97]. These large variations in coal composition determine the type of 
coal available for different applications — Figure 8. 
 
Figure 8 
Types of coal depending on carbon/energy and moisture content, with their 
shares in total coal reserves and typical applications11 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: [104] 
 
Figure 8 shows the electricity generation sector to be the main consumer of coal 
worldwide. This is not surprising as power and heat generation account for more 
than half of global coal demand — Figure 9. The metallurgical sector comes next, 
                                          
10 Expressed in carbon content per energy unit. 
11 Low-rank coals are often called “brown coal” [57]. Sub-bituminous, bituminous and anthracite coals 
are sometimes called “black coal” [78]. 
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mainly for the production of pig iron and to a lesser extent steel12. Worldwide, 
coal accounts for about 40% of fuel inputs to power generation and 70% of fuel 
inputs to iron and steel making [97]. 
 
Figure 9 
Main applications of coal 
Source: Adapted from [27] 
 
This study looks at coal use in the electricity (and heat) generation sector only. A 
thorough analysis of this sector is therefore undertaken to examine the prospects 
for coal use. The main competing fuel inputs to power plants, especially natural 
gas, are also analysed in detail. Other coal applications, in particular the 
production of iron and steel, are not considered for the following reasons: 
 Iron and steel making requires coal with very specific properties — coking 
coal. Coking coal is of superior quality to steam coal and, if not available 
naturally, is produced from steam coal. Because of its superior qualities, 
coking coal is far more expensive than steam coal. It does not make sense to 
use coking coal where steam coal can be employed. The market niche for 
coking coal is therefore very narrow. World demand for coking coal is about 
nine times smaller than world demand for steam coal, being roughly equal to 
world trade in steam coal — Figure 10 [27, 90, 97]. 
 Unlike steam coal demand, coking coal demand has remained virtually flat 
over the past 20 years — Figure 10, despite the impressive growth in iron and 
steel making. This is due to the large energy savings achieved in iron and 
steel manufacturing over that period. Additional large efficiency gains (25-
35%) can be still attained in a number of countries [59]. Novel iron and steel 
making technologies, e.g. Pulverised Coal Injection (PCI) for Direct Reduction 
of Iron (DRI), where the conventional blast furnace is bypassed and steam 
coal quality is employed, will most likely further restrict the market for coking 
coal [15, 27, 57, 78, 97]. 
 World trade in coking coal is less than half the world trade in steam coal, and 
it is of little relevance to the EU. The very specific qualities of coking coal limit 
the number of potential suppliers. The players in the world coking market are 
very few and the trade itself is concentrated in the Pacific region. On the 
supply side, Australia is basically the key supplier, responsible for more than 
50% of world coking coal exports [91]. On the demand side, Japan accounts 
for 30% of imports, followed by South Korea and India, each responsible for 
10% [57]13. 
 
                                          
12 Steel is typically produced from pig iron in oxygen steel furnaces [57]. 
13 Europe imports small quantities of coking coal mainly from Canada. 
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Figure 10 
World steam and coking coal demand and trade 1982-2005, (Mt) 
Source: Adapted from [57] 
 
 Cement manufacturing and other industrial sectors, along with residential and 
agricultural uses of coal, are not considered in this study since they account 
for much lower shares of total coal use compared to power generation and 
steel making, especially in the EU. 
 
Figure 8 also suggests different logistics chains for brown and hard coal. The main 
quality parameter for coal is the carbon/energy content — the higher, the better. 
While the transportation of hard coal over long distances could make sense under 
certain conditions, it seems economically inefficient for lower-grade coal with a 
high impurity content. Brown coal should be therefore consumed either on-site or 
only within a short distance from the coalfield. 
 
As indicated by Figure 10, world steam coal trade has more than doubled since 
the beginning of 1980s. More than 85% of all traded coal travels by sea, as this is 
the cheapest transport mode for mass cargoes such as coal. Consequently, 
seaborne trade in steam coal has registered an 8% annual growth over the past 
20 years [104]. Minimising transport costs is paramount for the competitiveness 
of suppliers to the world coal market, since transport costs can account for up to 
70% of final delivery costs [91]. Nevertheless, the world freight market for bulk 
dry cargoes and the structure of transport costs are not analysed in this study for 
the following reasons: 
 With a 20% share, coal accounts for a significant part of the dry cargo 
segment of the world freight market, but not the major part. Larger cargoes, 
mainly ores, define freight rates in this segment. Thus, coal freight rates are 
not autonomously determined. 
 For many years, the world freight market has functioned close to a situation 
of perfect competition. There are no cartels or single ship-owners with 
excessive market shares. The supply of vessel capacity and freight rates 
typically reflects the actual demand/supply balance in the freight market. 
Consequently, the dry cargo freight market has been more or less stable over 
several decades, with freight rates usually fluctuating within a margin of +/-
25% [46]. 
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 Despite the long-term stability, however, sharp short-term variations in 
freight rates are possible, as the freight market is very sensitive to changes in 
demand and supply for vessel cargo carrying capacity. These rapid 
fluctuations, combined with the secondary nature of freight markets in general 
(as they depend on goods markets), make even medium-term forecasts 
extremely challenging14. 
 
Although the world reserves of low-rank and hard coal are similar (Figure 8), their 
consumption trends are quite different. The world consumes much more hard coal 
than brown coal and the gap is growing continuously — Figure 11. In addition, 
the preference is naturally for coal that is easier (and cheaper) to recover [78]. 
Without a corresponding increase in hard coal reserves, which will most likely be 
more difficult and more expensive to exploit than hard coal deposits in the past, 
the world is going to run out of higher-quality coal much earlier than it will of 
lower-quality coal15. 
 
Figure 11 
World hard and brown coal demand 1980-2005 (Mt) 
Source: Adapted from [57] 
 
Depending on the geology of deposits, in particular the depth of seams, coal is at 
present recovered in two ways: surface (open-cut) or underground (deep) 
mining. Surface mining is economic only when the coal seam is relatively close to 
the surface. It allows high coal recovery rates from deposits — 90% and more. 
Surface mining is more frequently used for lower-quality coal types. The majority 
of world coal reserves (≈60%) are recoverable only by deep mining. This is true 
especially for hard coal, where deep mining accounts for ≈2/3 of all recovery 
worldwide. The recovery rates in underground mining are much lower than those 
for open-cut mining — from 50-60% for the cheaper room-and-pillar technology 
to ≈75% for the far more expensive long-wall technology16 [97, 104]. Standard 
calculations of coal reserves, and hence R/P ratios, do not take into account 
feasible recovery rates. The amount of actual recoverable coal is therefore less 
than the widely published estimates of reserves, and the real R/P ratios are also 
lower17. 
                                          
14 A more complete discussion of the impact of the freight market on the international coal market is 
provided in the complementary consultants’ report “Coal of the Future”, EUR 22644 EN. 
15 Calculating R/P ratios separately for brown and hard coal is not feasible, as the statistical sources 
used in this study [12] and [57] employ different classifications for brown and hard coal reserves. 
16 Room–and-pillar allows coal production to start much more quickly using mobile machinery that 
costs under $5 million, while long-wall mining machinery can cost $50 million [91]. 
17 Not re-calculated, as [12] and [57] use different classifications for brown and hard coal reserves. 
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In addition to the consumption patterns, the geopolitical distribution of brown and 
hard coal differs as well. Figure 12 shows that Europe, including the EU, holds 
mainly lower-quality coal. This is due partly to unfavourable geology, but also to 
the long history of coal extraction in the industrialised EU countries. The majority 
of easy-to-recover hard coal reserves in the EU have already been exploited. 
Thus, the EU is today forced to opt either for expensive and technologically 
complicated underground extraction of high-quality coal at great depths, or for 
the exploitation of existing lower-quality reserves, or for imports of hard coal18. 
 
Figure 12 
Breakdown of world proven brown and hard coal reserves at the end of 2005 (%) 
Source: Adapted from [12] 
 
The breakdown of coal reserves by types and world regions in Figure 12 is slightly 
misleading as regards their actual diversity. Indeed, in almost all regions coal 
deposits are concentrated in one or a few countries — Figure 13. Consequently, 
world coal reserves and especially those of the tradable high-quality grades are in 
fact concentrated in a small number of countries. Six countries (USA, China, 
India, Russia, South Africa, Australia) thus hold 84% of world hard coal reserves. 
Four out of these six (USA, Russia, China, Australia) also account for 78% of 
world brown coal reserves — Figure 13. 
 
As already explained in the Annex to this report, proven reserves tend to increase 
in periods of rising market prices. Proven reserves can also increase as a result of 
new discoveries and/or techno-economic improvements in mining technologies. 
All these give access to deposits that were previously not economic to exploit, 
thus converting reserves into proven reserves. In this light, the key technical and  
                                          
18 A more detailed discussion on the EU’s indigenous coal production is included in Chapter 4. 
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Figure 13 
Regional and world shares of the top 10 richest countries in hard and brown coal 
reserves worldwide (%) /Note: the relative ranking is given in brackets/ 
Region Country Regional share Global share 
  Hard coal Brown coal Hard coal Brown coal 
North America USA 96.3 97.5 23.3 (1) 31.4 (1) 
South & Centr. Brazil - 82.9 -   2.4 (6) 
America Colombia 80.9 -    1.3 (10) - 
 Kazakhstan 25.1 -   5.9 (7) - 
 Czech Rep. -   2.0 -    0.8 (10) 
Europe Germany -   3.7 -   1.5 (7) 
& Greece -   2.2 -   0.9 (9) 
Eurasia Poland 12.5 -   2.9 (9) - 
 Russia 43.7 61.7 10.3 (4) 25.1 (2) 
 Turkey -   2.2 -  0.9 (8) 
 Ukraine 14.5 10.2   3.4 (8)   4.2 (5) 
Africa South Africa 96.4 - 10.2 (5) - 
Asia Australia 20.0 38.2   8.1 (6)  9.3 (4) 
Pacific China 32.3 50.1 13.0 (3) 12.2 (3) 
 India 46.8 - 18.8 (2) - 
Share of top 5 in world total  75.6 82.2 
Share of top 10 in world total  97.2 88.7 
Source: Adapted from [12] 
 
technological routes to increasing world proven coal reserves appear to be: 
 Development and implementation of improved mapping technologies for coal 
resources and reserves; 
 Improvement of existing underground coal mining technologies; 
 Accelerated research and development of novel coal exploitation technologies 
to give access to “non-conventional coal”, e.g. underground coal gasification 
(Figure 14) and the utilisation of coalmine methane gas19. 
 
Figure 14 
Underground Coal Gasification 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: [104] 
 
 
                                          
19 These technical and technological paths are not explored further in this report, but are thoroughly 
assessed in the complementary consultants’ report “Coal of the Future”, EUR 22644 EN. 
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3. COAL: USE AND COMPETITION 
 
Since coal is the most carbon-intensive fossil fuel, its use for electricity 
generation is heavily dependent on future GHG-reduction policies — the stricter 
the policies, the lower the expected use of coal and vice-versa. As regards 
competition with other fuels, the share of coal in gross fuel inputs to power 
generation will depend on the relative price gap with natural gas — the cheaper 
the coal compared to gas, the greater the use of coal and vice-versa. The relative 
fuel price gap is of crucial importance for coal, since its lower fuel costs have to 
compensate for the higher investment costs of coal-fired power plants compared 
to gas-fired plants. The ongoing liberalisation of electricity and gas markets in the 
EU and other developed economies favours greater use of gas for electricity 
generation at the expense of coal, as gas is associated with lower and more easily 
managed risks for power plant operators. However, this growing reliance on gas 
creates security and diversity of supply risks for the EU, as it is becoming 
increasingly dependent on gas imports from Russia. Furthermore, take-overs of 
gas companies by electricity companies may create risks of monopolies and 
oligopolies. On equal terms, coal will most likely remain a key fuel for power 
generation in countries that possess abundant indigenous coal resources.  
 
As Figure 9 indicates, power generation accounts for by far the largest share of 
coal use. It is widely agreed that electricity consumption is going to grow faster 
than total energy consumption both in the EU and worldwide — Figure 15. This is 
driven by two factors — one general and one regional. The general factor is that 
electricity is by far the preferred energy option, as it is arguably the easiest, 
safest and cleanest form of energy. The regional factor is that electricity 
consumption per capita in the less developed (non-OECD) countries is currently 
far lower than in the industrialised (OECD) countries. However, this is about to 
change, as a clear empirical link has been found over the years between 
increasing electricity consumption per capita and decreasing poverty [60]. 
 
Figure 15 
Projected annual growth in consumption of total energy and of electricity in EU-
27, OECD and non-OECD countries, and worldwide, over 2010-2030 (%) 
Source: Adapted from [26, 30] 
 
The electricity market is governed by several factors. The most important for this 
study and within the European context are analysed below. 
 
Electricity demand is characterised by large variations over the day and the week. 
It is difficult to predict whether these differences in consumption will grow or 
decline in future, but one thing is sure — they will not disappear. With current 
technologies, the economic and energy-efficient storage of large amounts of 
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electricity is still a challenge. Reserves of generating capacity and fuels therefore 
have to be built up to cover peaks in demand. This brings additional costs — in 
the latter case, these are the costs of building and operating extra fuel 
transhipment and storage facilities. In the former case, the investment in spare 
generating capacity is recouped at a slower rate, as this extra capacity is used 
exclusively during demand peaks. Other tools are a diversified electricity pricing 
policy and improved grid management (electricity transmission networks). The 
importance of the latter component, sometimes underestimated in the past, is 
recently enjoying increasing attention [54, 60]. 
 
The emissions of greenhouse gases (GHG) and the related phenomenon of global 
warming and climate change are raising growing concerns all over the world. The 
power sector is the largest GHG emitter among the industrial sectors. The 
signatories of the Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change aiming to reduce world GHG emissions, including the EU-15, 
therefore have to look carefully at the GHG emission performance of their 
electricity generation sectors. Coal is the most carbon-intensive of all fossil fuels. 
Other things being equal, burning coal results in the largest CO2 and GHG 
emissions per generated unit of electricity20. In countries where the reduction of 
GHG emissions is a policy priority (such as the EU member states), coal use for 
power generation is thus under pressure. In the EU, therefore, coal has been 
gradually replaced with natural gas (Figure 16), which is the least carbon-
intensive fossil fuel. The virtually carbon-free nuclear and renewable pathways 
offer other options to cut GHG emissions. In short, GHG reduction policies have 
and will have a major impact on the future use of coal. However, the uncertainty 
regarding GHG policies in the post-Kyoto period (after 2012) complicates the 
investment perspective for coal. This investment uncertainty is particularly 
important for Europe, where most coal-based electricity generation capacity is 
over 25 years old (Figure 17) and hence, has to be replaced within 15-20 years 
[51, 80]. The energy chain choice, whether e.g. gas, nuclear or again coal21, will 
have a major long-term impact on electricity supply. In any case, if GHG policies 
 
Figure 16 
Retrospective and projected breakdown of fuel inputs to electricity generation in 
EU-25 over 1990-2030 (%) 
Source: Adapted from [29, 30] 
                                          
20 CO2 accounts for by far the largest share of all GHG emissions. Even the most advanced integrated 
gasification combined-cycle (IGCC) coal-firing power plants emit approximately two times more CO2 
than similar natural gas combined-cycle (NGCC) plants [59]. 
21 With or without carbon capture and storage. 
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are tightened, coal will most likely lose out again, at the expense of natural gas, 
renewable energy sources and, under certain conditions, nuclear power [70]. 
 
Figure 17 
European coal-fired power plant building activity 1920-2000 
 
Source: [51] 
 
Other environmental concerns and regulations, e.g. for local pollutants from large 
combustion plants [35], have a major impact on investment decisions in the 
power sector as well. Due to the content of sulphur, nitrogen and inorganic 
matter, coal is again at a disadvantage compared to natural gas, which contains 
virtually only carbon and hydrogen. As with GHG policies, the strengthening of 
such environmental protection regulations or, even worse, the uncertainty as to 
the limits they will impose further increases the reluctance to invest in coal power 
stations. 
 
Another advantage of natural gas over coal is the typically higher electricity 
generation efficiency — Figure 18. Even modern and novel coal-based electricity 
generation systems are not likely to surpass the efficiency of current natural gas 
power plants. The marginal efficiency gains will be offset by the marginal increase 
in on-site energy consumption to comply with stricter emission standards22. It 
should also be remembered that these more sophisticated coal plants will cost 
even more than conventional coal plants, which are already more expensive than 
natural gas plants. Last but not least, efficiency improvements can also be 
expected for natural gas facilities. All in all, coal-based power plants will most 
likely remain less efficient than natural gas-based power stations [51, 59]. 
 
As Figure 18 indicates, electricity generation efficiencies vary from region to 
region. Apart from external reasons (e.g. a poor coal quality or a warmer climate 
reduces efficiencies), there are also intrinsic reasons for this variation. These are 
primarily to do with the technical and technological level of power stations. As 
they have more financial resources, the richer OECD countries generally have 
more up-to-date facilities with higher efficiencies than non-OECD countries. 
Higher investment costs are offset by smaller fuel inputs, which reduce GHG 
emissions and lower overall generation costs [51]. 
 
                                          
22 For instance, it is believed that the introduction of carbon capture and storage technologies will 
reduce the total electrical efficiency of such advanced coal plants to 42% [51]. 
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Figure 18 
Average electricity generation efficiencies for centralised coal and gas-fired power 
plants in various countries, regions and worldwide (%) 
Source: Adapted from [51, 62] 
 
The process of liberalising electricity markets, under way in many countries 
around the world, is happening in the EU as well. As from 1 July 2007, the 
electricity market in the EU will be fully liberalised [36]. These new “rules of the 
game” completely change the investment climate in the sector. Electricity 
generation is a highly capital-intensive business, although the various fuel 
pathways have a different breakdown of fixed and variable costs. Amongst the 
key fuel pathways (Figure 16), nuclear power has the largest share of fixed costs, 
followed by coal, while natural gas comes last. Conversely, the highest variable 
costs, the main component being the cost of the fuel itself, are for natural gas, 
followed by coal — Figure 19, while nuclear power has the lowest [80]. Obviously, 
the higher the share of fixed costs, the higher the risk in a liberalised market 
environment, as the recouping of fixed costs requires continuous operation at 
maximum load. In brief, the natural gas pathway, though more volatile, is 
associated with lower long-term investment risks than the coal pathway. The  
 
Figure 19 
Average costs of natural gas and coal-fired power plants 
Source: Adapted from [59] 
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natural gas pathway is subject mainly to the risk of short-term market 
disturbances on the fuel supply side, as natural gas prices tend to fluctuate more 
than e.g. coal prices (Figure 4). However, the risk of higher natural gas prices can 
be more easily covered by raising electricity prices23 compared to the risk of 
running a coal plant at partial load for long periods of time24. In any case, 
investing in the traditional mid- and base-load electricity chains, such as coal and 
nuclear, is becoming less attractive [49, 70]. 
 
Natural gas for electricity generation has an additional advantage over coal and 
nuclear power. The economic scale of natural gas power plants is lower than that 
for coal and especially nuclear facilities. Natural gas plants are therefore more 
flexible as regards location. They are appropriate both for smaller-scale 
decentralised and for large-scale centralised power generation. Conversely, the 
coal and nuclear options are suitable only for large-scale power plants. 
 
In brief, a power generation strategy based on natural gas under the conditions 
of liberalised electricity markets is indeed flexible, but creates long-term risks for 
the stability, reliability and affordability of electricity supply [52].  
 
The strategy of liberalising electricity markets is particularly sensitive for peak-
load capacities, which are operated at a low utilisation rate and hence a low rate 
of return. Without explicit rules, power operators on open markets may decide 
simply not to provide electricity above certain peak levels that are no longer 
economic. Regulatory counter-measures to meet such peaks in electricity demand 
at affordable prices could give extremely negative signals to investors in such 
immature open markets. The experience so far indicates that price caps could 
work, but only for a certain period of time and if fixed at a sufficiently high level 
[49]. One also has to keep in mind that electricity distribution is often not 
liberalised — which may create market imperfections [53]. 
  
The dynamics of natural gas prices have a substantial impact on the structure of 
the power generation sector. The fast penetration of natural gas in the power 
sector in the 1990s was largely driven by the relatively low price of natural gas — 
Figure 4. Conversely, the rising natural gas prices since 1999 have slowed down 
its penetration in the electricity sector, pushing up coal use. The influence of 
variations in natural gas prices is also evident in various energy projections. 
When relatively lower gas prices prevail, energy forecasts are more favourable to 
natural gas, and vice-versa — Figure 20. 
 
The fuel breakdown for power generation is also governed by other factors — 
regional availability of fuels and/or of infrastructure for their transportation and 
storage, geopolitical factors, established traditions, etc. Coal-rich countries, such 
as China, Australia, India and USA, obviously tend to have large coal shares in 
their national power generation systems (79%, 77%, 68% and 51%, respectively 
[59]). Wealthier countries tend to use more sophisticated fuel pathways with a 
less direct environmental impact (e.g. natural gas, nuclear, modern clean coal) 
compared with less developed countries, where the emphasis is on low-cost 
energy — Figure 21.  
 
 
                                          
23 Owing to increased living standards, most electricity uses in the OECD countries today in fact lack 
alternative and competitive substitutes that can quickly replace them. Hence, consumers are basically 
forced to accept any increase in electricity prices, unless they are willing to change their consumption 
patterns (with a corresponding decline in living standards). In short, electricity demand tends to be 
extremely inelastic. 
24 Another disadvantage of coal versus natural gas is that while constructing a coal power plant takes 
approximately 4 years, a natural gas power station needs only 2-3 years [80]. 
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Figure 20 
Retrospective and projected breakdown of fuel inputs to electricity generation 
worldwide over 2000-2025 — 2003 projections (when natural gas prices were 
lower) and 2006 projections (when natural gas prices were higher), (%)25 
Source: Adapted from [25, 26] 
 
Figure 21 
Retrospective and projected breakdown of fuel inputs to electricity generation in 
OECD and non-OECD countries, 2000-2030 (%) 
Source: Adapted from [25, 26] 
 
Along with electricity market liberalisation, the EU market for natural gas will also 
be fully liberalised as from 1 July 2007 [37]. As natural gas is becoming 
increasingly important for power generation, this will increase the risk for power 
plant operators, moreover that especially since the natural gas market is also 
capacity-bound. The solution is either to move to other fuel inputs or to hedge 
the market risk by acquiring some control over natural gas supply [47, 49, 52]. A 
trend for players in the electricity market to take over natural gas companies has 
                                          
25 Similar, however less pronounced trends are observed also for the EU when comparing projections 
from 2003 [29] and 2006 [30]. 
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thus been observed in several EU member states (UK, Germany) [70]. Such 
mergers could, however, create monopolies or oligopolies that could pose threats 
to the proper functioning of electricity markets [42, 49]. 
 
An over-reliance on natural gas for electricity generation hides another risk for 
the EU. Although the EU has managed to diversify its natural gas imports to some 
extent over the past 10 years, 1/3 of all its natural gas imports still comes from 
Russia — Figure 22. On the other hand, Russia is currently even more dependent 
on the EU, as the EU is basically its only large gas market. Such a situation raises 
a number of worries on both sides. In the EU, apart from the familiar political and 
economic concerns, the future ability of Russia to fulfil its international 
commitments for natural gas deliveries is recently being increasingly questioned. 
The old giant fields, supplying low-cost natural gas today, are getting depleted. 
To meet future commitments to Europe, new fields that are more difficult to 
exploit need to be developed. These fields are moreover smaller than those 
currently exploited, and hence production costs will in any event be higher. The 
corresponding pipeline infrastructure has to be built as well. Pursuing an 
aggressive expansion policy, Gazprom (by far the largest gas company in Russia) 
has committed to large deliveries to the EU. The investment to match these 
commitments, however, has so far not been secured. There are some suspicions 
that this is deliberate, so as to increase the pressure on gas prices [43]. In 
addition, it is so far not clear where the necessary investment funds will come 
from, especially given the particular sensitivity of opening the Russian natural gas 
system to foreign investment. Nonetheless, the lion’s share of natural gas 
deliveries to the EU’s liberalised market will still come from Russia, whose gas 
market is far from liberalisation [52, 62, 63]. The plans announced lately to boost 
Russian energy and in particular natural gas exports to Asia from 3% today to 
30% in 10-15 years, with the aim of diversifying Russian energy exports, raises 
additional worries in the EU about the security and prices of Russian natural gas 
supplies [1, 41]. Last but not least, the recent memorandum of understanding on 
cooperation in upstream activities, signed between the national gas giants of 
Russia (Gazprom) and Algeria (Sonatrach), raises concerns about the potential 
creation of an OPEC-like natural gas cartel and price fixing for natural gas exports 
to the EU [42, 43, 44, 45, 64]. 
 
Figure 22 
EU-25 gas imports by country of origin in 1994 and 2004 (%) 
  
Source: [34] 
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4. COAL: POTENTIAL THREATS TO SUPPLY BY REGIONS 
 
Hard coal production in the EU generally suffers from largely depleted deposits, 
declining coal quality and extremely high production costs. Indigenous lignite 
production is still competitive with hard coal imports, but the economic reserves 
of the main EU lignite producers might be depleted earlier than widely 
anticipated. On the other hand, coal exports are getting concentrated in the 
hands of a few countries. Australia is gradually becoming the ultimate global 
supplier of coal. Other traditional key exporters like South Africa, Indonesia and 
USA face significant challenges in the development of coal reserves and export 
capabilities. The USA and China — former large net exporters — are gradually 
turning into net importers with an enormous potential demand, together with 
India. Exports from other possible large producers (Russia, Kazakhstan, 
Colombia) face substantial logistics problems. 
 
The aim of the following exposition is not to provide a full and complete overview 
of coal supply and demand by countries in the world. Such information is widely 
available from several reliable sources, e.g. the IEA, including its Coal Industrial 
Advisory Board (CIAB), the US Department of Energy, Eurostat, etc. The goal of 
this section is rather to highlight some facts and circumstances in selected 
countries and regions, which may affect coal supply in the future. As such, it does 
not pretend to provide a complete analysis, but concentrates more on the 
implications for the EU. 
 
As Figure 23 indicates, world coal production has been steadily expanding over 
the past few decades. Since 2000, growth has accelerated owing to the huge 
increase in Chinese coal production, driven mainly by the sharp increase in power 
generation. All in all, over the period 1971-2005 the share of industrialised 
(OECD) countries in world coal output has declined at the expense of the share of 
developing countries and emerging economies. Coal production has also 
decreased in the countries of the former Soviet Union, due to the major socio-
economic upheavals there in the 1990s. 
 
Figure 23 
Absolute (Mt) and relative (%) evolution of world hard coal production by regions 
over 1971-2005  
 
(continues on the next page) 
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* Asia excludes China, which is shown separately 
Source: [61] 
 
 
4.1. EUROPE 
 
At present, the prospects for European coal production are quite clear. Indigenous 
hard coal production in the EU will continue to decline (Figure 24) for several 
reasons. Hard coal has been intensively mined in Europe for more than a century 
and the easier accessible deposits of good quality have already been exploited 
[47]. As hard coal in Europe can be recovered mainly from underground 
deposits26, European coal miners are forced to go for deeper and more difficult to 
recover reserves of poorer quality, which increases costs [15, 28, 47, 90]. 
European indigenous hard coal production is two to three times more expensive 
than imported coal [47, 75]. Some EU countries have therefore ceased hard coal 
production. In the countries where hard coal production still exists (mainly for 
socio-economic reasons), it is heavily subsidised27 [50, 75, 85, 90], but the 
subsidies are gradually being phased out. The expiry of the European Coal and 
 
Figure 24 
Hard coal production in EU-27 over 1992-2004 (Mt) 
Source: Adapted from [18] 
                                          
26 With the exception of the UK, where hard coal is recovered also via surface mining 
27 Again with the exception of the UK, whose indigenous hard coal production is generally competitive 
(without large subsidies) to imported hard coal. 
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Steel Community28 in 2002 has accelerated this process. 
 
The case of lignite is different. The EU has greater reserves of lignite than of hard 
coal (Figure 12), and reserves are available and exploited in a larger number of 
countries (Figure 25). Lignite in Europe is typically mined open-cut, which keeps 
extraction costs low. European lignite production is generally cost-competitive 
with imports of hard coal without subsidies [50, 75]. Consequently, lignite 
recovery in the EU will most likely survive, unlike hard coal production. Lignite 
represents an important energy source for the EU, as it helps to reduce its energy 
import dependence. Nevertheless, the R/P ratios (under current economic and 
regulatory conditions) in the major EU lignite producers are rather low, e.g. 
Germany — 33 years, Greece — 54 years [12]. 
 
Figure 25 
Lignite production in EU-27 over 1992-2004 (Mt) 
Source: Adapted from [18] 
 
All in all, it is projected that overall European coal production will continue to 
decline. By 2010, its share in total primary energy production will drop below 
20% [30]. The gap between consumption and internal production will be covered 
by increasing imports (Figure 5). For those imports, Europe will not have many 
suppliers to choose from since most world steam coal exports today (≈85%) come 
from just eight countries — Figure 26.  
 
 
4.2. AUSTRALIA 
 
Australia is nowadays the largest single exporter of steam coal, accounting for 
about 20% of world trade. Although coal was discovered in Australia in the 18th 
and 19th centuries [85], it is a relatively young player in the world steam coal 
market — it first started exporting at the end of 1970s. The Australian coal 
industry has always been export-oriented. The share of exports in gross 
production has increased from 60% in 1990s to more than 80% today [15]. Coal 
deposits are plentiful and of very high quality [4, 94]. They are suitable for 
surface mining, which ensures high recovery rates, possibly the highest 
productivity in the world [90], and competitive production costs (Figure 27). All 
                                          
28 In brief, the goal of the ECSC was to support and coordinate coal and steel production in the EU. 
The ECSC has been replaced by the Coal and Steel Research Fund, whose tasks are different. 
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these factors point to bright prospects for the Australian coal industry and 
exports. Most likely, Australia will consolidate its leading position on the world 
export market for steam coal [26, 76] and will be the supplier that meets any 
unexpected rises in global demand [46]. 
 
Figure 26 
Major steam coal exporting countries in the world over 1992-2005 (Mt net 
exports) 
Source: Adapted from [18, 57] 
 
Figure 27 
Indicative steam coal values on FOB trimmed basis (USD per tonne)  
Source: Adapted from [64] 
 
The recent sharp increase in world coal demand and hence trade has cut the 
Australian R/P coal ratio by almost 40% — from 297 years at the end of 2000 to 
213 years at the end of 2005 [7, 12]. If these trends continue, proven reserves 
should still be sufficient by 2020. In view of the healthy status of the national coal 
sector, the conversion of additional reserves into proven reserves should not 
prove difficult [2]. These hopes are based on the recent major restructuring of 
the sector, which has resulted in improved efficiencies [15, 50]. Nevertheless, the 
cost of developing new coalfields will certainly be higher, as the new deposits 
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tend to be located further away from the major exporting facilities. Of more 
concern is the need to expand export facilities, mainly the seaport infrastructure. 
The recent troubles and delays in vessel handling in the major Australian coal 
exporting terminals have strengthened these fears [15, 46]. 
 
 
4.3. INDONESIA 
 
Indonesia emerged as a key steam coal producer and exporter only in the 
beginning of 1990s. Since then, production and exports have grown exponentially 
— Figure 26. The fast expansion of production and exports is due to favourable 
geology — almost all coal comes from open-cut mines with fairly low capital 
costs. Even so, maintaining the present high output rates and export volumes 
may quite soon pose challenges. First of all, Indonesia’s proven reserves are not 
as plentiful as those of other major coal exporters. The fantastic growth in 
production over the past two decades has been achieved mainly thanks to 
intensive exploitation of the easily accessible deposits. As a result, the coal R/P 
ratio has almost halved over only six years — from 68 years at the end of 2000 to 
just 37 years at the end of 2005 [7, 12]. With these trends and with no additional 
investment in the coal sector, Indonesia would run out of economically 
recoverable (at current economic and operating conditions) reserves of coal much 
earlier than widely anticipated [76]. On the other hand, the investment needed, if 
made, will almost certainly raise coal production costs, with a corresponding 
negative impact on the country’s international competitiveness [50]. Substantial 
improvements (and investments) are also urgently needed in the seaport 
infrastructure, which has recently become the main bottleneck for Indonesian 
coal exports [15, 46, 50]. The availability of coal for export could come under 
further pressure from the widely expected significant increase in domestic 
consumption, along with economic growth [2, 46]. 
 
 
4.4. SOUTH AFRICA 
 
South Africa is amongst the most mature and stable world coal exporters. The 
development of the national coal industry goes back to World War II and the 
following international apartheid embargo on oil supplies. Coal exports began in 
the late 1970s, as a response to the changing energy world and the much higher 
oil prices after 1973. Since then, the country has proven itself to be a reliable 
supplier of high-quality steam coal worldwide. Proven reserves are plentiful and 
production has been matched over the years by the development of new 
deposits. Consequently, the R/P ratio is still above 200 years despite the long 
history of coal extraction.  
 
Nevertheless, increasing and even maintaining production and export volumes in 
the future may pose challenges for several reasons: 
 About 60% of coal production comes from underground mines, and this share 
will increase in the future [90]. Most currently operated mines are 
approaching the end of their economic life. There is a common consensus that 
the development of new reserves will be much more costly than the 
development of the old deposits (Figure 27). In addition, the quality of the 
coal from these new reserves is considered to be less than the quality of coal 
from existing fields. Taken together, these factors may result in proven 
reserves lower than the current estimates [21, 46, 50, 69]. 
 The plans for a partial switch to gas in the national energy system may have 
an adverse impact on the prospects for indigenous coal demand, with knock-
on effects for export potential. Since South Africa has traditionally used a lot 
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of coal, the critical factor for developing new mines has so far at least been 
the internal market, while the export potential has been regarded as a 
secondary priority [69]. 
 The majority of the new deposits tend to be located further away from the 
main export terminals. This implies the need to develop completely new 
logistics chains and costly infrastructure. The capacity of the railway network, 
operated by the state-owned company Spoornet, is of particular concern [15]. 
Securing sufficient port handling capacity, along with the related investment 
funds, is another important challenge for South African coal exports [21, 46, 
50]. 
 The wide spread of AIDS/HIV amongst mineworkers presents another very 
serious risk for the coal industry in South Africa [68, 78]. 
 
 
4.5. SOUTH AMERICA 
 
Like Indonesia, South America is a relatively young player in the steam coal 
export market — significant exports started only in the mid-1980s. Colombia is by 
far the largest producer and exporter in the region, although Venezuela also has 
stable, though much smaller exports — Figure 26. Steam coal from these two 
countries enjoys a good market for two main reasons. First, it is of good quality, 
with a high calorific value and low contamination [90]. Second, Colombia and 
Venezuela enjoy a favourable geographical location, being closer to the large USA 
and European markets than other major exporters such as Australia, Indonesia 
and South Africa [21, 46]. Venezuela seems to be the lowest-cost producer and 
exporter worldwide, being the only country together with Indonesia to have 
export costs below USD 20 per tonne FOB trimmed — Figure 27. The impressive 
growth in Colombian production and exports has resulted in a reduction in the 
country’s R/P ratio (falling from 177 years at the end of 2000 to 112 years at the 
end of 2005 [7, 12]), but sufficient additional reserves appear to be available. 
The major issue in this respect seems to be the security of sufficient foreign 
investment [90]. The key challenge for the Colombian coal export industry is the 
timely development of adequate export logistics and infrastructure (railways and 
ports) [15, 46]. This is also a prime concern for Venezuela [50], which however 
has in addition administrative impediments to the development of deposits to 
exploit the full production and export potential [85]. 
 
 
4.6. CHINA 
 
China holds the third largest reserves of hard and brown coal worldwide (Figure 
13), and is by far the largest single producer (Figure 23) and consumer of coal 
globally. China alone is responsible for about 40% of world coal demand today, 
while coal accounts for 70% of Chinese primary energy consumption [3, 57, 77]. 
Almost 80% of Chinese electricity generation is based on coal [3, 56]. Unlike in 
other countries, coal is used widely as a fuel for households as well. Although the 
percentage of household consumption in total coal use is small, it is remarkable in 
absolute terms, especially when compared to the developed (OECD) countries [1, 
77]. In view of these impressive numbers, even modest changes in Chinese coal 
production and consumption patterns could have a tremendous impact on world 
coal supply and demand. Just by way of illustration, all of Australia’s steam coal 
exports are equal to only 5% of Chinese steam coal consumption. The analysis of 
the Chinese coal sector therefore merits particular attention. 
 
China emerged as a key exporter of steam coal in 2000. Since then, export 
volumes have been fluctuating, but the most recent figures indicate roughly the 
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same level of exports as in 2000 — Figure 26. There are many different views as 
to how Chinese coal exports will develop in the future. The assumption in the 
current study is that the pessimistic scenario, i.e. China turning from a large net 
exporter to a huge net importer of coal, is far more probable in the medium term, 
because of the reasons explained below. 
 
Although China has been amongst the leading exporters of coal over the past few 
years, the share of exports in its total coal production has been modest. The 
recent huge growth in production, driven by consumption for electricity 
generation, has reduced the share of exports in gross output — Figure 28. The 
share of exports has been brought down basically to the levels before the boom 
in indigenous production (Figure 23). A level of reserves of less than 2.5% of 
total production for exports cannot be perceived as sustainable in the long term, 
because any slight increase in indigenous demand will be taken from the export 
market, resulting at the same time in a parallel increase in imports [3, 21, 26, 
76]. 
 
Figure 28 
Share of Chinese exports of steam and coking coal in indigenous steam and 
coking coal production over 1990-2005 (%) 
Source: Adapted from [18, 57] 
 
As Figure 28 indicates, this has already occurred for coking coal. In 2004, China 
turned from a major coking coal exporter into a modest importer, with 
nonetheless an immense potential, driven by the fast growth in the domestic iron 
and steel industry29. Obviously, coking coal exports could restart and steam coal 
exports could once again increase, provided there is enough spare production 
capacity. The indications, however, are that the economic reserves to boost 
indigenous coal production have already been largely exploited, and if such an 
increase occurs, it will be achieved at a much higher cost. 
 
While China’s coal reserves seem plentiful in absolute terms, they are just 50% of 
the world average per capita [95]. This fact is of particular concern, as China is 
amongst the countries most heavily dependent on coal. The Chinese coal R/P 
ratio amounted to only 50% of the world average before the post-2000 explosion 
                                          
29 Over 2000-2003, the Chinese iron and steel industry grew by 73%, and China is currently the world 
leader in steel production with a 23% share [77, 78, 104]. 
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in production. The development of new deposits has been lagging far behind the 
growth in output. Consequently, the R/P ratio has halved over just 6 years – from 
116 years at the end of 2000 [7] to just 52 years at the end of 2005 [12]. With 
such trends and with no additional investment in the coal sector, China would run 
out of economically recoverable (at current economic and operating conditions) 
reserves of coal much earlier than widely anticipated. These negative tendencies 
can be offset by the accelerated development of additional reserves. However, 
such development will pose challenges for the following reasons: 
 The great majority of coal reserves are deep (average depth 330 metres) and 
are suitable only for sophisticated and expensive underground mining. Under-
ground mining accounts for about 95% of total coal output — a proportion 
likely to remain stable in the future. Developing new underground mines takes 
4-5 years on average. This means that no major incremental growth in 
reserves can be expected by 2010 [66, 70]. 
 Any intensive development of new coalfields will put equipment suppliers and 
markets under enormous pressure. For strategic reasons, China has always 
preferred national coal mining technologies to foreign technologies30. It is 
rather uncertain whether even domestic and foreign manufacturers of mining 
equipment together will be able to meet such a huge increase in demand. 
Even if they manage to do so, it would anyway be achieved at much higher 
prices, which will subsequently be reflected in coal production costs. 
 Productivity and recovery rates in Chinese mines are much lower than the 
world averages31. Other things being equal, this means that deposits twice as 
large are needed to extract the same amount of coal. 
 For decades, China has had the worst coalmine safety records in the world32. 
With the increase in living standards, poor coalmine safety is becoming a 
growing issue in the country. 
 Indigenous coal is of acceptable, but not very high quality. It has a relatively 
high sulphur and ash content that lowers the calorific value. Coal washing is 
one way of overcoming this problem, but it is difficult, increases costs and 
causes large energy losses [47, 66]. 
 The vast majority of coal deposits in China are located in the north and north-
east of the country, while the main consumption centres are in the south and 
southeast [46, 56, 66]. This involves long-distance, expensive transport by 
railway33, which significantly pushes up the final delivery cost. For the 
southern coastal regions, therefore, it is more cost-effective to go for imports 
from Indonesia, South Africa or Australia than for indigenous coal from the 
north [77]. 
 Although the recent projections foresee a slower marginal growth in power 
generation and consequently in coal consumption, China is still hungry for 
electricity. The relative electricity consumption per capita is only 50% of the 
world average. The rural areas are of particular concern [56]. Thus, the 
building of new power plants will continue more or less at the same pace and, 
given the lack of other large-scale fuel options in the near to medium term, 
there is a wide consensus that coal will continue being the main fuel input for 
electricity generation in the foreseeable future [1, 3]. 
 Also not to be ignored is the extremely high rate of growth in the iron and 
steel industry, which accounts for a large proportion of indigenous coal 
consumption. As with power generation, this growth is projected to continue 
                                          
30 Approximate ratio 9 to 1 [77]. 
31 The average recovery rate in Chinese underground mines is 30-32% — less than half the world 
average [50, 66, 95]. 
32 Almost 6,000 coalmine victims in 2003 [77]. 
33 Over 60% of coal is transported by railway over an average distance of 550 kilometres [77]. 
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in the future. Obviously, this will put further pressure on indigenous coal 
reserves. 
 
There are two ways in which internal demand for coal could be eased and hence 
export potential at least be maintained at current levels. These are improving 
efficiency and fuel switch. Both approaches, however, do not look feasible in the 
near to medium term. 
 
Although the efficiency of coal-based power plants has recently increased 
considerably, it is still lagging behind those in industrialised countries — Figure 
18. It has been estimated that if China manages to bring the average electrical 
efficiency of its power plants up to that of the industrialised countries, this would 
result in a ≈20% reduction in coal demand [59, 86]. The lower electricity 
generation efficiency is due to several reasons: the poor performance of old 
power plants, many of them being too small, the poor quality of coal, etc. [66]. 
Another challenge is the inefficient grid distribution system. Huge investments will 
be needed to improve all these aspects. This might be a key constraint, not so 
much because of a deficit of funds, but for economic reasons. The marginal cost 
of upgrading old power plants has to be seen against the alternative incremental 
fuel cost. If coal remains relatively cheap, the incentives to raise electrical 
efficiency will weaken. Another hindrance to investment in increasing power plant 
efficiencies is the still heavily regulated national electricity market [56, 77]. 
Deliberately keeping electricity prices close to and sometimes even below 
generation costs does not provide investment incentives [2]. In any case, the 
priority for power plant operators is cost efficiency, not electrical efficiency. As in 
the power sector, there is a large scope for improving energy efficiency in the iron 
and steel industry as well, where Chinese energy consumption is again much 
higher than that in the industrialised countries [66]. 
 
Fuel switching in power generation may be a feasible solution, but mostly in the 
long term. China is generally poor in natural gas. The prospects of increasing the 
share of natural gas are mainly linked to pipeline deliveries from Russia and LNG 
supplies from the Middle East. Neither option is expected to become a real large-
scale alternative in the next 10-15 years. Nuclear power is also an option, but 
needs huge capital investment, whose recuperation may be challenging in an 
environment of centrally regulated, low electricity prices. Hydro is already 
exploited in China, but its share of total electricity output is declining for a 
number of reasons [56]. One of the most important causes is the already 
noticeable impact of climate change, leading to low river levels, which also affect 
nuclear power [69]. 
 
 
4.7. FORMER SOVIET UNION 
 
As Figure 13 indicates, the three largest countries in the former Soviet Union 
(Russia, Kazakhstan and Ukraine) hold almost 20% of the world’s hard coal 
reserves and 30% of brown coal reserves. Even so, they are not major players in 
the world coal market. After the substantial economic changes in the 1990s, 
Ukraine has become a net importer of coal, Russia has re-started exports just 
recently and only Kazakhstan has managed to keep a noticeable presence on the 
world market, but with a gradually declining volume and share — Figure 26. The 
future of coal exports from Russia and Kazakhstan remains uncertain, but they 
will most likely play only a minor role in the coal market. The reasons for this 
assumption are the following: 
 Except for the coalfields currently in operation in the Kuzbass region (Western 
Siberia), the great majority of Russia’s other coal reserves are located in the 
central and eastern parts of the country, away from both the main consuming 
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centres in the western (European) part of the country and the seaports in the 
far east. Bringing that coal to either destination involves expensive rail 
transport. Rail transport is also required for the currently operated Kuzbass 
coalmines. Consequently, Russia is a relatively expensive producer of coal 
(Figure 27), competitive on the world market only when international coal 
prices are high [4, 46, 47, 50, 70, 85, 90]. Kazakhstan faces similar 
problems, and its competitiveness depends on keeping railway costs as low as 
possible [85].  
 Russia’s railway system is generally in a poor state. There is a particular 
dearth of railway infrastructure in the low-populated Siberian regions, where 
the major coalfields are located. The seaport infrastructure is not any better 
either. Significant investment is needed to overcome these shortcomings, but 
the funds have not been secured [21, 46, 50]. 
 Coal production and exports suffer from a generally low level of mechanisation 
and productivity, as well as poor mine safety [47]. 
 
Taking into account all the above factors, Russia no longer appears to be a coal–
rich country [47, 85]. The most feasible option, which however would not boost 
coal exports, would be to use the coal from remote fields for internal energy 
needs. This could be done either by building coal-fired power plants near the 
remote deposits and then transmitting or exporting the electricity (“coal-by-wire”) 
or via gasification of the coal reserves with subsequent transhipment of the coal-
derived gas. In both cases, significant investment is needed to improve and/or 
construct new transmission networks and/or pipelines. This option might be 
attractive for Russia from a strategic point of view, since it would release 
additional natural gas for export — maybe the country’s most strategic export 
commodity. Indications of an intention to construct such coal-based power plants 
have already been expressed in public [4, 26, 84]. 
 
 
4.8. USA 
 
The USA has the greatest reserves of both hard and brown coal worldwide (Figure 
13) and is the second largest global consumer of coal after China [57]. Power 
generation absorbs about 90% of indigenous coal production, coal accounting for 
more than a half of US electricity [50, 70, 90]. Production has a long tradition, 
and with minor exceptions has seen stable growth since the 1960s [85]. High-
quality hard coal obtained from open-cut mining dominates total output. So far, 
extraction costs have been kept relatively low owing to high mine productivity. 
With such a large and attractive internal market, exports have traditionally had a 
lower priority for the national coal industry. In the past, the USA has acted mainly 
as a ”swing supplier” to the world coal market [46, 50]. 
 
However, the future of USA coal extraction may not be as bright as its past, even 
though absolute coal reserves are plentiful with an R/P ratio of 240-250 years 
over the past few years [7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12]. An indication of the troubles likely 
to affect coal production is the recent transformation of the USA from a net 
exporter to a net importer of steam coal34 – Figure 26. Some analysts suggest 
that this trend could become even more pronounced in the future [26, 46, 76]. 
The key challenge for the US coal industry in the coming decades is the rising 
cost of production, due to the following reasons: 
 The productivity of coalmines is steadily decreasing. After many years of 
exploitation, the old coalfields are getting depleted and output is decreasing. 
Their further exploitation is associated with higher costs. Since high 
                                          
34 However, exports of coking coal have remained virtually at the same level since 1999 [57]. 
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productivity has been the main asset of the US coal industry, such a 
development will turn the USA into a high-cost producer (Figure 27) no longer 
competitive on international markets [1, 21, 26, 64]. 
 The only large potential so far unexploited lies in Alaska. However, these 
deposits may not come on stream until after 2015 [46]. Further delays are 
possible due to the generally low return on US coal investment, which also 
affects the upgrading of existing coalfields [91]. 
 As with China and Russia, the majority of coal has to be transported inland by 
rail, which further boosts delivery costs. Railway network capacity is also often 
insufficient even for current flows [19, 64]. 
 
Taken together, the above factors favour cheaper imports, especially from nearby 
Colombia and Venezuela, thanks to low freight rates. 
 
 
4.9. INDIA 
 
India ranks second in global hard coal reserves (Figure 13) and is amongst the 
largest coal users worldwide. 70% of indigenous coal production goes on 
electricity generation, coal accounting for 2/3 of fuel inputs to the Indian power 
sector. Coal output has been rising at a steady rate of about 4% per year since 
1990 [57]. The development of proven reserves has followed the growth in 
extraction. The coal R/P ratio has declined only marginally and still exceeds 200 
years, well above the world average [7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12]. About 75% of coal 
comes from open-cut mines. The factors that may adversely affect the security of 
coal supplies in India are the following: 
 Most Indian coal is of poor quality because of the rather high content of ash 
(30-50%) and water (4-7%) and consequently a low calorific value (13-21 
MJ/kg). When such coal is directly employed in power generation, the 
resulting electrical efficiencies are low. Alternatively, coal can be pre-treated 
(washed), but this adds to the costs and results in an 8-15% energy loss [67]. 
 Although the gross R/P ratio is high, the amount of realistically exploitable 
reserves is uncertain. At present, most Indian coal is mined at depths of 150-
300 metres. The deposits at such depths may be sufficient for 50-60 years 
only [94]. The recovery of deeper reserves may be precluded by excessively 
high costs. 
 Most coalmines are state-owned, a fact that constrains private investment in 
the sector. Investment in coal supply is particularly impeded by distribution 
regulations and control over foreign investment. The operation of coalmines is 
outdated and productivity is very low compared to international standards, 
especially in underground mining [50, 67].  
 Most coal deposits are located in the northeast part of the country, while the 
major consumption centres are in the west and southwest (including coastal) 
areas of the country. Bringing coal to the major consumers, especially in 
unwashed form, involves expensive transport by rail over large distances 
(500-750 km). Transport costs may account for up to 70% of total delivery 
costs. For a number of reasons, including the presence of three different 
gauges, the condition of the Indian railways is far from perfect. Improving the 
railways calls for huge investment, which does not seem realistic in the 
foreseeable future. For these reasons, and also to improve average coal 
quality, many power plant operators in the west and southwest parts of India 
are importing increasing volumes of higher-quality steam coal35 [67]. 
                                          
35 For fuel quality reasons, India has already for some years now been importing large amounts of 
coking coal for its domestic, fast-growing steel industry. 
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 The power generation sector is heavily regulated and electricity prices are 
kept at very low levels that basically preclude investment [50]. Power plant 
operators have little incentive to invest in improving coal quality, the 
development of logistical infrastructure or the modernisation of power plants 
[67]. Most power plants are over-aged, outdated and consequently inefficient 
(Figure 18). 
 
The current 10% share held by imports in India’s total coal supply may increase 
in the future, driven by several factors. Electricity demand is set to expand along 
with the fast-growing economy [70]. Another aspect driving electricity demand is 
the low electrification rate especially in rural areas, where the grid connection 
level is only 30% [67]. Increasing the share of imports may be the preferred 
option, not only because of the poor quality of indigenous production but also 
because surface mining, which is suitable for the majority of indigenous coal 
reserves [70], requires the relocation of population and activities. Such relocation 
might pose challenges in view of the country’s high population density [78]. On 
the other hand, imports may be impeded by the generally poor state of port 
infrastructure and the resulting port congestion and vessel delays, on top of the 
usual heavy delays during the monsoon season [47]. All in all, however, 
considering the size of the country, even a modest increase in imports will most 
likely give very strong signals to the regional and world coal markets. 
 
 
 
 
 36
5. THE WAY FORWARD: COAL IS NOT WHAT IT SEEMS 
 
The enhancement of the world coal supply base will most likely result in higher 
production costs. Owing to advances in energy conversion technologies, which 
allow a large variety of end products to be produced from different feedstocks, 
the world oil, gas and coal markets are becoming increasingly inter-related. The 
energy market of the future will tend to become a market for hydrocarbons rather 
than one differentiated by energy sources. In turn, this is expected to have 
important implications for coal supply and demand patterns in the future. 
 
The analysis in the preceding chapters indicates that coal might not be so 
abundant, widely available and reliable as an energy source in the future. Building 
on these findings, this chapter tries to investigate the future cost and price trends 
for coal, as well as its affordability. The analysis concentrates on the factors that 
may affect coal demand and supply and their implications for coal costs and 
prices, rather than on projections of given coal price levels. 
 
From an economic point of view, the perception of cheap coal is somewhat 
misleading. The categories “cheap” and “expensive” always have to be regarded 
in relative terms, not as absolute values. Product X is cheaper or more expensive 
compared to Product Y based on certain evaluation criteria. Applying other 
evaluation criteria, Product X may no longer be cheaper or more expensive than 
Product Y. In the case of energy, the relative cost ranking of various fuels has to 
be evaluated on the basis of the whole energy chain — from fuel extraction to 
final energy use. This approach reveals why, although the fuel cost of coal is 
lower than that of gas (Figure 4), the costs of the coal and gas electricity 
pathways are similar due to the higher investment costs for coal — Figure 19. 
 
In addition, Product X could be cheaper than Product Y even if the production and 
final delivery costs of Product X are higher than those of Product Y. Prices do not 
always reflect costs. Often they are driven by other factors, e.g. the volume, 
structure and restrictions of demand and supply. The world natural gas and, 
especially, oil markets represent very good examples of such phenomena. 
 
The demand for energy is not only driven by fuel cost and price levels. It also 
depends on the marginal relative preference for one fuel over another. It is 
influenced by the level of technological progress and by other, non-energy-related 
factors as well. Faster progress in certain technologies may boost the demand for 
certain fuels and vice-versa. Such progress can also lead to the emergence of 
new fuels that were of no use before and/or had no or negative value. Non-
energy factors, such as environmental concerns, the regional availability of 
certain fuels and infrastructure for their utilisation, the existing structure of 
national energy systems, the security and diversity of energy supply, etc., often 
have a strong influence on energy consumption patterns. 
 
Going on from the slightly theoretical exposition above to the matter at hand, it is 
true that historically coal has been cheaper than oil and gas on an energy content 
basis. This may change, however, not only due to the higher cost of coal 
application technologies compared with natural gas (coal’s main rival on the 
electricity market), but also because the following factors behind the lower price 
for coal may no longer be present in the future: 
 Lower attractiveness (for environmental reasons) of coal compared to nuclear 
power and especially natural gas for electricity generation in industrialised 
countries. Nonetheless, energy demand in developing countries and emerging 
economies is rising faster than in industrialised countries. By definition, low 
costs are of higher priority than a clean environment for less developed 
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countries. The fact that the largest energy consumers amongst these 
countries have bigger reserves of coal than of oil and gas will give an 
additional impetus to coal demand and prices.  
 Low concentration of supplies with a relatively large number of market actors. 
At present, the four biggest players in the coal business — BHP Billiton, Anglo-
American, XSTRATA (owned by Glencore) and Rio Tinto — hold just 40% of 
the world steam coal trade [46]. In addition, several countries have been 
heavily competing on the world steam coal market over the past 10 years — 
Figure 26. As a cumulative result, absolute coal prices have not changed much 
over the past two decades (Figure 4), while relative coal prices (versus gas 
and oil) have steadily declined — Figure 29. The situation may change with 
the gradual concentration of export supplies in Australia, where the majority 
of coal production is in the hands of the four largest coal companies in the 
world [15, 78]. However, the emergence of an OPEC-like cartel for coal seems 
little probable in the foreseeable future. Its creation would also be difficult 
because the coal industry is much smaller and has far less economic power 
than the oil and gas industries [46, 78, 85]. 
 
Figure 29 
Coal price as a percentage of gas and oil prices, and gas price as a percentage of 
oil price in EU-15 over 1987-2005, recalculated based on energy content (%) 
Source: Adapted from [12, 18, 57] 
 
 The regional and country overview in the preceding chapter has revealed that 
coal recovery in most countries will incur higher production costs in future. 
Since international coal prices are still linked to production costs (see above), 
an increase in the global price levels of coal can be expected. On the other 
hand, any enhancement of world coal reserves may be hampered by the poor 
return on investment in coal mining over the past few decades [46, 70]. The 
low profitability has been due to the strong price competition in the world 
market and correspondingly low coal prices. Although the investment needed 
to secure adequate reserves of coal by 2030 is estimated to be only 3% of all 
necessary investment in the energy sector by 2030 (compared, for instance, 
to 19% for gas) [64], the lack of a sufficient and stable cash flow may impede 
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a timely commitment [48]36. Consequently, the coal supply base may be 
further squeezed and the pressure on coal prices reinforced by such 
pessimistic expectations. This phenomenon can be termed the “psychological” 
depletion of proven reserves, which always comes before physical depletion. 
 Research and development (R&D) spending on coal mining has been steadily 
declining over the past 20 years. The privatisation of the coalmining sector in 
many countries has contributed further to this fall, as private companies 
usually operate with a shorter-term vision, subject to market pressures. The 
large know-how gaps cannot be eliminated overnight. Developing, 
demonstrating and implementing novel mining technologies will take time, 
along with the corresponding training in their use [73]. 
  
The future coal markets will be strongly influenced by the development of energy 
technologies, which are becoming increasingly sophisticated. Good and constant 
fuel quality is a crucial factor for their proper operation. While in the past coal 
prices have depended mainly on calorific value, in the future other factors such as 
sulphur and ash content will be important. The coal market will most likely 
become more diversified into sub-segments depending on particular coal 
properties, rather than constituting a single market for a single coal quality [20, 
48]. 
 
Chapter 3 has revealed the growing dependence of coal markets on gas markets 
and vice-versa. As regards oil, coal has been related indirectly to it via natural 
gas, because in some regions, e.g. in Europe, natural gas prices have been linked 
to oil prices. These links will strengthen further with the implementation of novel 
energy conversion technologies, in particular for the production of oil-like fuels 
from alternative energy sources — gas-to-liquids (GTL) and coal-to-liquids (CTL) 
[62]. With the recent rise in world oil prices, GTL is starting to enjoy a growing 
interest. At present, several large GTL plants are at different stages of realisation. 
CTL has been known for decades, having already been applied on an industrial 
scale during World War II. Both GTL and CTL are less energy-efficient than oil 
refining. Nonetheless, GTL and CTL are increasingly popular because they allow 
diversification from oil. In particular, concerns about the security and diversity of 
oil supply are the key driving forces for GTL and CTL today. In addition, GTL and 
CTL provide fuels of a higher quality [74]. Where CTL is concerned, besides the 
facilities already operating in South Africa, China has recently indicated a 
significant interest in developing such plants [26, 59, 77, 104]. The key motive 
for China, in addition to its (still) abundant indigenous reserves of coal, is the 
opportunity to reduce its energy dependence on the Middle East. Unlike other 
regions, e.g. Europe, China is currently forced to import most of its oil and gas 
from the Middle East [3, 4, 26]. In view of the above trends, the future world oil, 
gas and coal markets will most likely become increasingly inter-related and the 
energy market will tend to develop into a global market of hydrocarbons [40, 78]. 
Consequently, the relative gap between coal prices and oil and gas prices will 
most likely narrow — Figure 29. This will be more pronounced for higher-quality 
coals, and a wider differentiation in coal prices, depending on quality 
specifications, may be expected. 
 
The demand for energy can be drastically reduced if energy efficiency across all 
sectors improves. Since electricity generation is the prime consumer of coal, 
raising efficiency in this sector could shrink coal demand. However, efficiency 
improvements may be impeded or delayed, and the actual reduction in coal 
demand may be smaller than initially expected, because of the following reasons: 
                                          
36 The volatile return on investment and poor profitability were indeed the key reasons for the big oil 
companies to leave the coal business in the late 1990s [46, 78, 93]. 
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 Efficiency can be increased either by upgrading existing power plants or by 
replacing old electricity generation facilities with new facilities. However, both 
options need significant additional investment that can be recouped only over 
a relatively long period of time. As already discussed in Chapter 3, the 
liberalisation of electricity markets has increased the investment risk for such 
initiatives. The priority for all power plant operators is to generate electricity 
cost-efficiently, not energy-efficiently. Unfortunately, these two objectives do 
not always go hand in hand. Investing in more energy-efficient plants also 
needs a long-term vision (10-20 years) and stability in regulatory frame-
works, especially for GHG emissions and local pollutants. The shorter-term 
horizon of current GHG abatement policies and their only partial global 
coverage seriously hamper investment decisions. As it is generally safer to be 
exposed to short-term fuel risks than to long-term investment risks, 
investment in more energy-efficient technologies in such a situation of 
uncertainty will be driven exclusively by sound indications of a sustained 
growth in fuel prices over the long term. Recent estimates suggest that plenty 
of oil and gas could become available if the long-term oil price stays above 
USD 30 per barrel37 [55]. Such a level does not appear high enough to boost 
large-scale investment in more energy-efficient technologies, in particular for 
power generation. 
 Tougher environmental standards for the operation of power plants require 
the installation of additional and expensive flue-gas cleaning facilities. All 
these facilities consume energy. The efficiency gains from improved 
technologies can be partly or fully offset by the additional energy consumed 
by cleaning facilities. For instance, the widely discussed carbon capture and 
storage technologies will most likely result in an 8-12 percentage-point loss in 
electrical efficiency in the medium term, possibly falling to 4 percentage 
points in the very distant future [51, 59]. In parallel, carbon capture and 
storage may result in a significant (30-120%!) increase in investment costs 
for power plant [50]. 
 
As already mentioned in Chapter 3, the future development of GHG abatement 
policies will have crucial impact on the market prospects of coal. Policies aimed at 
a further reduction in GHG emissions will generally weaken the position of coal at 
the expense of nuclear, gas and renewables, and coal prices are likely to fall. If 
GHG penalty and abatement policies do not have global coverage, but encompass 
only selected countries, regions or group of countries, GHG-intensive technologies 
will tend to migrate to countries and regions that are not committed to such 
policies [70]. Such a situation is already emerging and is very likely to continue, 
due to the following factors: 
 Pursuing GHG reduction policies is in fact an investment strategy for future 
generations, where expenditure today pays off at some point in the future. 
Such an investment strategy involves spending substantial funds today — 
which many less developed countries simply cannot afford. In those countries, 
producing cheap and affordable electricity is more important than producing 
environmentally friendly electricity [51]. 
 The impact of GHG is not localised by region but is global. If a GHG reduction 
in one part of the world is accompanied by a greater increase in GHG 
emissions in another part of the world, the net global GHG balance will still be 
negative — something that we observe today (Figure 30). GHG reduction at 
global level remains uncertain, since some of the largest GHG emitters, such 
as the USA and Australia, have not ratified the Kyoto Protocol to the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. Other Kyoto Protocol 
signatories that are experiencing fast growth in GHG emissions, such as China 
                                          
37 In 2004 prices. 
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and India (Figure 30), do not have quantitative reduction targets [102]. The 
parallel GHG abatement initiative — the Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean 
Development and Climate, which started in July 2005 and became operational 
in January 2006 — does not set GHG reduction targets. In brief, the aim of 
the initiative, which brings together Australia, China, India, Japan, South 
Korea and the USA, representing approximately 50% of world GHG emissions, 
energy use, GDP and population, is to establish technical and technological 
cooperation in the field of GHG abatement without compromising economic 
growth [64, 96]. 
 
Figure 30 
Index of CO2 emissions from energy, in the world and by selected countries over 
1990-2003 (index points, 1990=100) 
Source: Adapted from [31] 
 
In a hypothetical situation with global joint efforts to curb GHG emissions, it is 
believed that carbon capture and storage can secure the survival of coal. 
However, such an assumption is somewhat doubtful for the following reasons: 
 Carbon capture and storage technologies are still at the research and 
development stage. Their practical implementation will require a great deal of 
techno-economic, environmental and regulatory constraints and concerns to 
be overcome. Thus, a wide consensus has recently been emerging that carbon 
capture and storage may represent a viable industrial-scale technology option, 
but in the longer term only. By that time, other technology options may also 
become more broadly available, such as renewables (especially wind and 
solar) and more environmentally compliant nuclear power. The energy mix 
may therefore be different from the mix today, also because of changes in 
energy consumption patterns [51, 59]. 
 The largest techno-economic potential for carbon capture and storage is 
estimated to be in Europe, the USA and Australia [51]. However, the USA and 
Australia in particular are the two industrialised countries with the softest GHG 
reduction policies at present. Bringing them into a Kyoto-like target-based 
mechanism for GHG reduction, especially in view of their recently launched 
Asia-Pacific Partnership on Coal Development and Climate initiative, seems 
rather doubtful in the foreseeable future.  
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6. ANNEX 
 
Three categories of coal deposits are commonly distinguished at all levels (from a 
single mine to the global scale): resources, reserves and proven reserves — 
Figure 31. The expression “coal reserves” as used in this report in fact refers to 
“proven reserves”. 
 
Figure 31 
Resources, reserves and proven reserves 
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”Resources” are the widest category and designate the overall amount of coal 
that may be available. The quantification of resources is approximate. The figure 
for resources does not take into account the technical or economic feasibility of 
coal extraction. 
 
”Reserves” refer to that part of resources that can be recovered with current 
technologies. This implies that reserves are more precisely quantified than 
resources. However, the figure for reserves does not take into account the 
economic feasibility of coal extraction. 
 
This economic aspect is considered in the concept of “proven reserves”. In brief, 
proven reserves express that share of coal reserves that can be economically 
recovered at current market prices [57, 91]. More specifically, proven reserves 
express those quantities that geological and engineering information indicates 
with reasonable certainty can be recovered in the future from known reservoirs 
under existing economic and operating conditions. In this light, if the reserves 
remaining at the end of any year are divided by the production in that year, the 
result is the length of time – the reserves-to-production (R/P) ratio – that those 
remaining reserves would last if production were to continue at that level [12]. 
 
The above indicates that the “proven reserves” category is the most difficult to 
quantify, and the figures are indeed highly speculative. Proven reserves provide a 
rough estimate of the economically recoverable reserves at given extraction costs 
and market prices. This estimate sometimes can be highly subjective, depending 
on a number of non-market factors, e.g. government subsidies. In general, 
proven reserves tend to diminish in periods of low market prices for coal and tend 
to increase in periods of rising prices. There is some time lag in both cases, 
Resources 
Reserves 
Proven 
reserves 
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though it is somewhat longer in the latter. This is because it always takes more 
time to bring additional facilities into operation than to reduce or stop coal 
production [47, 78]. Proven reserves can also increase as a result of new 
discoveries and/or techno-economic improvements in mining technologies. The 
latter give access to deposits that were previously not economic to exploit, thus 
converting reserves into proven reserves [104]. 
 
The three categories of deposits vary with time and are to some extent relative. 
The introduction of novel geological and mining technologies may boost resources 
and reserves, and may reduce extraction costs. Conversely, delays or cutbacks in 
R&D investment or in the development of existing or new mines may diminish 
reserves, if the recovery rates are sustained [22, 47]. The variation in proven 
reserves (both absolutely and vis-à-vis reserves) is more important for shorter-
term market equilibrium, while changes in reserves and resources have a more 
pronounced influence on longer-term market perspectives. 
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